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MORAL PHILOSOPHY

AND

LOGIC.

ADAPTED TO THE CAPACITIES OF

YOUTH.

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WITH AN ALLEGORICAL MAP.

"Moral philosophy is the science which teaches men their "duty, and the reasons of it."—PALEY.

"Logic is the art of using reason well in our inquiries after "truth."—WATTS.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

ELEMENTS,

&c.

OF THE

NATURE OF MAN.

MAN, as a rational creature, is compoſed of two parts—*ſoul* and *body*.

By the noble gift of *reaſon*, he is enabled to know God, and to poſſeſs merit or demerit.

That which animates him, we call *ſoul*. But as the ſoul performs three functions, it then receives different names:

When it thinks - -	*mind*
When it feels - -	*heart*
When only conſidered as the active principle -	*ſoul*

So that mind, heart, and ſoul, differ chiefly when conſidered in their different relations.

Thoughts belong to the *mind*—*affections* and *ſentiments*, to the *heart*—*ſenſations*, to the *body*—and *life*, to the *ſoul*.

Illuſtration.

Thoughts—are ideas attended to and dwelt upon. When a *clock*, ſteeple, or tree, offer themſelves to my view, they may excite in me a ſingle *idea*; but if I reflect upon ſome of their properties, this contemplation is a *thought*, the inference from which is, that we cannot *think* without attending to our *ideas*.

Affections and ſentiments—are actions of the *heart*, pleaſurable or painful, without the intervention of the *body*. Such are *friendſhip*, *gratitude*, *hatred*, *grief*, &c.

Senſations—are likewiſe actions of the *ſoul*, pleaſurable or painful, but cauſed by the channel of our ſenſes and the means of

our nervous ſyſtem: ſuch are *cold*, *heat*, &c.

Life—or animation, is that ſpring or principle which diſtinguiſhes the living from the dead; and in this acceptation beaſts and plants are ſaid to poſſeſs *life*.

Query.—Are we reprovable or criminal, when we have *bad thoughts*, *bad affections*, and *diſagreeable ſenſations*?

Aſſiſtance for the ſolution.—Thoſe things alone can make us reprovable or criminal which it is in our power to experience or not. The queſtion, therefore, to examine is, whether our *thoughts*, *affections*, or *ſenſations* depend upon ourſelves, and how far they can be influenced by reflection, habit, education, &c.

The qualities of the *mind* are - { *underſtanding*, *judgment*, *memory*, *imagination*, &c.

The qualities of the *heart* are - { *goodneſs*, *beneficence*, *probity*, *ſenſibility*, &c.

The qualities of the *body* are—a - { *good conformation* / *good organization*

Human perfection ſhould conſiſt in poſſeſſing every one of thoſe qualities of the *mind*, *heart*, and *body*: but God, in the all-wiſe diſpenſation of his gifts, granted the ſame individual but few of them, in order to humble his pride, and to intimate, that even thoſe he enjoys are temporary, and do not belong to himſelf.

Query.—Do the following qualities belong to the mind, heart, or body? *Strength, anger, appetite, indolence, awkwardneſs, piety, reaſon, ſenſe, cunning, pain, pleaſure, friendſhip, affectation, health, ill-humour, curioſity, ſincerity, detraction, calumny,* &c.

Aſſiſtance for the ſolution.—Thoſe muſt belong to the mind, heart, or body, which will, or will not, require the actions of the mind or participation of the body.

The ſtrong impulſes of our ſouls toward evil are called—*vices*; toward good—*virtues.*

Firſt

Firſt Principle.

All is good which is uſeful and right; and that is right which is recommended to us by ſome ſuperior intelligence, or, as Archdeacon Paley defines it, which is conſiſtent with the will of God.

Our three guides are—*conſcience*, *religion*, and *human laws*.

Second Principle.

All is evil that is injurious to others, or hurtful to ourſelves, and that is forbidden by laws divine or human.

Infractions againſt the laws of

Conſcience are called		*improbity*
Religion	-	*impiety*, or *ſin*
Human laws	-	*crimes*

Reaſon

Is the perfection of good ſenſe, and the determination of our will agreeably to the dictates of our conſcience.

Good Senſe

Is the right idea of things.

Right Ideas

Are the knowledge of what characterizes a thing; that is to ſay, if it is *good* or *bad*, *true* or *falſe*, *handſome* or *ugly*.

Third Principle.

Every thing has been conſidered *beautiful* that has proportions and properties anſwerable to the purpoſe for which it was deſigned. Proportion, if not *beauty* itſelf, is at leaſt one of its neceſſary and efficient qualities.

Example.

To limp, or to be crooked, cannot be beautiful; becauſe the purpoſe of arms and legs is to move properly and ſteadily.

Beauty in a man or woman, is to have every member in ſuch a proportion as to be adequate to their ſeveral functions.

Beauty

Beauty in a town, is to be well built, with ſtraight and open ſtreets, for eaſy circulation of air, and accommodation of the inhabitants.

Beauty in muſic, is when the ſounds agree with the words; or when, by mere ſounds, we feel the impreſſion intended to be conveyed.

A general principle and ſure rule to diſtinguiſh the *beautiful* is contained in this verſe of an eminent French writer:

"Rien n'eſt *beau* que le vrai, le vrai ſeul eſt aimable."

Nothing is ſo beautiful as the truth, truth only is lovely.

Therefore, when you are to judge of beauty or deformity, either in natural or moral things, remember the *preceding rule*, which alone can form good taſte.

Examples of *moral* beauty are ſincerity, modeſty, &c.; of *natural*—ſymmetry, gracefulneſs, &c.

Examples of *moral* deformity are, falſehood, immodeſty, &c.; of *natural*—diſproportion, awkwardneſs, &c.

OF THE

FUNCTIONS OF THE MIND,

AND THE

NATURE OF IDEAS.

AN *idea* is the picture or repreſentation of a thing in the mind. If the outlines of that picture or repreſentation are well and diſtinctly marked, then the idea is *clear:* if lightly or confuſedly drawn, then the idea is *obſcure.* When, for example, I think of a windmill, I conceive within me the picture of a mill, with its ſeveral parts; and

and then my idea is *clear*. But when I think of a tree with fourſcore branches, as the picture of ſuch a tree is not clearly diſtinguiſhed from another tree, then my idea is *obſcure* or *confuſed*.

When the picture of an object reſembles the object, we ſay that the picture is *juſt* and *right*; when our ideas agree with the properties of the object repreſented, then our notion is *right and true*; if it does not agree, it is *wrong and falſe*. For example, when I think of a ſhip, if I examine how its picture or image is formed within my mind, I ſhall find that ſuch a picture is repreſented agreeably to a real ſhip; that is to ſay, a floating houſe impelled by the action of winds upon the ſails, &c. Conſequently, my idea of a ſhip is *right*.

When you ſmell a roſe, and think that the ſweet odour belongs to the roſe, and not to your ſenſations, you have a *falſe idea* of odours.

Explanation.

Odours do not belong to flowers, nor lie in any material body, but are *affections of our ſenſes*; and if we attend to odoriferous bodies, we ſhall find that they emit a ſort of vapour or exhalation, which being collected in our noſtrils, affects our ſenſes pleaſantly or unpleaſantly; hence a ſweet odour is nothing elſe but our *ſenſes agreeably affected.* Smell is a *ſenſation*; now ſenſations do not belong to inanimate things; they are within us, and not in any thing without.

When you think the planets ſmaller than our moon, becauſe you do not obſerve they are at a greater diſtance, which reduces their apparent ſize, you have likewiſe a *falſe idea.*

When you obſerve a ſtone or a weight falling down, becauſe you do not ſee how it is acted upon, you think it falls of itſelf; and you have a *falſe idea* of heavineſs;

ſince

ſince bodies fall becauſe they are attracted. Your ideas would likewiſe be *falſe*, if you were to ſay, that a bottle is empty when the liquor has been poured out; for in nature there is no vacuity.

The mind, indeed, abounds with falſe ideas; but as it is moſt material to correct thoſe which relate to morals and reaſoning, we ſhall proceed with ſaying, that all ideas come from ſenſation or reflection. When the mind attends to our ideas, and dwells upon them, it becomes a *thought*.

Hence, *to think*, is - *to collect our ideas*.

Attention is nothing but the act of fixing our ideas; and, in order to do this more abſtractedly, ſome people are obſerved to ſhut or caſt down their eyes, when they wiſh to avoid any external interruption.

When we examine two ideas, and compare them, in order to find in what they differ or reſemble, then, from that compariſon, ariſes a third idea, called *judgment*.

Example.

When I think of the ſun and of the moon, theſe are two ideas; but if I conſider them both, and examine in what the ſun and the moon reſemble or differ, then my examination will produce another idea or judgment—that

One is warm, the other is cold.

Ideas are derived from our *ſenſes,* which form the channels through which our ſenſations are introduced. Theſe, as you know, are five in number:

Hearing	Taſte	Feeling
Smell	Sight	

Our bodies cannot feel, but our ſouls feel by means of the body. It was indeed a very important queſtion with the ſages of antiquity to determine in what part of the body the ſoul reſided; but all their philoſophical inquiries on that head proved unſatisfactory. One placed it in the ſtomach,

and

and another in the blood, or heart. Epicurus (as you may have remarked, in reading the ancient hiſtory) was a ſenſual philoſopher, whoſe greateſt pleaſure was to act the glutton; and he indulged an opinion, that the *ſtomach* being the ſeat of his pleaſurable ſenſations, was likewiſe the ſeat of his ſoul. Such a ſyſtem will appear to every rational judgment, ignoble and abſurd;—*ignoble*, becauſe it reduces men to the condition of brutes; and *abſurd*, becauſe people who have no appetite, or find no reliſh in eating, are not, therefore, deprived of ſoul. In ſpeaking of the abſurdity of this ſyſtem, I cannot help noticing three of the diſciples of Epicurus, in order to expoſe their groſs folly.

The firſt is the emperor Heliogabalus, whoſe effeminacy and luxury were only equalled by his prodigality. He cauſed his fiſh-ponds to be filled with water diſtilled from roſes; and his aqueducts to ſtream with wine. His favourite diſhes were

were the tongues of peacocks and nightingales, or the brains of parrots and pheaſants; and he is ſaid to have ſat at table for a whole day together, in gorging every thing that was exquiſite and extravagant.

2d. Horatius, who ſaid his *ſummum bonum*, or chief happineſs, was to drink; and believing that the pleaſurable ſenſation produced by liquor did not proceed from the ſtomach, but the throat; in the *throat* he concluded the ſoul reſided; and being aſked what favour he could wiſh to receive from the gods, anſwered—"To have the "neck of a crane, in order to prolong "the ſenſation produced by drinking."

3d. The gluttony of another was ſuch, that, after having eaten the greater part of a very large and rare fiſh, being half ſuffocated, and told by the phyſician he could not eſcape death—"Since I muſt die," ſaid he, "my laſt moment ſhall be happy. "Bring me back the remainder of my "fiſh."

The

The ſyſtem which placed the ſoul in the blood, or heart, muſt alſo be erroneous, becauſe a man, after being bled, has no leſs ſoul than before, and becauſe, in leſs than ſix weeks, the whole maſs of blood is changed, and renewed in the heart, without the leaſt alteration in the ſoul. But ſince anatomical diſcoveries have evinced that the nerves are the vehicles of our ſenſation, and that they extend, by infinite ramifications, through the whole body, and converge to the brain, it appears more probable that the ſoul ſhould reſide in the head: for when any one touches your finger, it is really your brain that is touched, and the motion produced there cauſes your ſoul to be affected. In this we may admire the providence of God, who, for the purpoſes of ſelf-preſervation, cauſed us to be diſagreeably and painfully affected when any hurtful change takes place in any of our members: but when the communication of the nerves is checked, or ſuſpend-

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ed between the brain and any of the extremities (as happens from palſy or ligatures), then a man may witneſs his own arm or leg cut or punctured without pain; and it has been obſerved, that thoſe who had an arm or leg cut off many years before, have complained of violent pains in their toes or fingers. But this you will readily account for, when you conſider that in all our ſenſations we refer them to ſome part of our body, and, by a mechanical habit, that reference is kept up, even when the object is abſent or extinct.

When the ſoul is deeply abſorbed in the contemplation of any object, it does not ſee or feel what happens to the body: ſuch was the caſe of a man deemed a ſorcerer, who was able ſo far to abſtract himſelf from his ſenſes as not to appear hurt when pinched or pricked.

It is a very extraordinary truth, that the ſoul does not always require the preſence of objects by which it is affected; their internal picture or repreſentation is often ſufficient

ficient to produce the ſame ſenſations as the objects themſelves.

In the ſtate of ſleep we ſee, feel, ſmell, hear within us, and receive nearly the ſame ſenſations of pain, joy, heat, cold, &c. as when awake: but ſuch operations ſeem merely mechanical, and without the aſſent or participation of the will.

The imagination of ſome people during their dreams has ſuch an influence upon the body as to move and direct it as in a waking ſtate. Theſe ſort of people are called *ſomnambules*—that is, ſleep-walkers; and they really perform many operations very aſtoniſhing, as to talk, dreſs themſelves, go out of the houſe, and come back to their beds, without the uſe of their eyes; and, if not interrupted, without the leaſt riſk of miſchief.

Thoſe involuntary motions produced in the body without the aſſent or determination of the ſoul, are called mechanical, and reſide wholly in the nerves. They are of a nature adapted to keep up the action

of

of the nervous ſyſtem, even after the communication with the ſoul is interrupted.

OF

ANIMALS.

BY attending to the actions of animals, we find they have not only ſenſations, but even memory and many of our affections, as gratitude, attachment, &c. But all their operations are merely mechanical, having no variety; and being no farther directed than to ſelf-preſervation: therefore, not having a free or ſpontaneous determination, they cannot have either merit or demerit.

Some philoſophers have been pleaſed to aſſert, that the ſouls of men and beaſts were

were of the ſame nature, and that in the former they appeared more perfect, becauſe a more perfect organization was more favourable to the exertion of their faculties: in conſequence of ſuch a notion, they entertained the ſame veneration for the ſoul of an animal as for that of a man, and abſtained from hurting, killing, or eating any living creature. That ſyſtem was called *metempſychoſis*, becauſe it included the belief of the ſoul's tranſmigration; and was inculcated by the famous Pythagoras (of whom you have undoubtedly read in the Grecian hiſtory), and who, the better to inſinuate his doctrine, pretended to be conſcious of having been a cock during the ſiege of Troy, two hundred years before. You may alſo learn, from our modern oriental travellers, that the bramins of the Eaſt Indies retain the ſame belief, and are religiouſly careful not to take away the life of any beaſt, fiſh, or inſect, for fear of homicide, deeming them fellow-creatures.

But

But we who are enlightened by the purer doctrines of revelation, know that our ſouls are not only immortal, but after their ſeparation from the body will exiſt in a ſecond and eternal ſtate, to enjoy the preſence of God, amid "the ſpirits of juſt men made perfect," or be deprived of this high privilege, according to our merit or demerit in this probationary world.

OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF BEINGS.

WHATEVER exiſts we call a *being*.

God is the Supreme Being, becauſe he exiſts above all, before all, and created all; and "without him was not any thing made that was made."

There are three ſorts of *being*—viz. *material*, or phyſical—*ſpiritual*, or meta-phyſical;

phyſical; and *moral*, in point of morals.—

1. *Material*, as all that we can ſee, feel, ſmell, hear, taſte.
2. *Spiritual*, all that is above our ſenſes, as the ſoul, its faculties, ideas, &c.
3. *Moral*, that is, things that relate to morals, as virtue, vice, &c.

Beings that cannot be divided are called *individuals*—a man, a dog, &c.

Exercises,

For the Purpoſe of Claſſification.

Sun	Divinity	Angel	Probity
Heart	Snail	Charity	Wolf
Tree	Thunder	Lady	Fiſh
Crime	Falſehood	Stone	Body
Goodneſs	Parrot	Gluttony	Friendſhip.

Q. Point out which of theſe may be called individuals, and of what claſs?

Here it may not be improper to make you acquainted with certain terms, which will

will enlighten your ideas of many things that perhaps you have never clearly underſtood. I mean theſe words—*emblem*, *metaphor*, *figure*. Theſe are nothing more than ſpiritual or moral beings, repreſented under material forms and ſhapes, but borrowing from thoſe material objects ſome well-known moral character: for example—*fidelity* is a *moral being*, which could not ſtrictly be repreſented with material colours; but that repreſentation may be right under the material form or ſymbol of a *dog*, whoſe moral character is to be faithful: now, that repreſentation will be an *emblem*. A *metaphor* is a ſimile compriſed in a word, and is intended to illuſtrate, without the formality of a regular compariſon. A *figure* is a manner of expreſſion differing from the ordinary mode, and more emphatical. Thus in ſpeaking or writing, when we endeavour to give our ideas vigour and animation, we borrow the qualities of ſenſible objects, and transfer them to thoſe which are inanimate; as when we ſay, the *furious*

waves,

waves, an *irritated ſea*, a *ſmiling meadow*, &c.; and this manner of ſpeaking, not naturally nor ſtrictly exact, is called *metaphoric* and *figurative*.

You will perceive from hence how uſeful it is to know in what manner *moral ideas* may be repreſented under *material ſhapes*. This is very ingeniouſly ſhown in the *mythology* of the ancient poets, where every virtue and vice was perſonified, or changed from a paſſion to a perſon.

MATTER.

MATTER, *body*, *ſubſtance*, are the ſame, and expreſs all that exiſt about us and ſubſiſt by themſelves—as *elements*, *mankind*, *animals*, &c. But to be *juſt*, *tall*, *lovely*, &c. cannot exiſt by themſelves; they want

want an object to adhere to, being themſelves but attributes.

And hence you may plainly comprehend why grammarians have called thoſe words *ſubſtantives* that expreſs a *matter* or *ſubſtance* exiſting by itſelf; and thoſe *adjectives*, that are added as attributes, and cannot exiſt by themſelves.

If we compare material beings with thoſe that are ſpiritual, we ſhall find their qualities or properties are almoſt all oppoſite.

The noble and remarkable property of the ſoul *to impreſs motion* demands our admiration; for material bodies can neither move themſelves nor others, according to that eſtabliſhed

Axiom,

No body can move another body, if not moved itſelf.

OF

CAUSES AND EFFECTS.

EVERY thing that exiſts has been produced by another thing, called *cauſe*.

A *cauſe* is that which produces, and an *effect* is that which is produced. From hence we derive theſe three leading truths or axioms:

No effect without a cauſe;
No effect can precede its cauſe;
When the cauſe *ceaſes, ſo the effect muſt ceaſe.*

Illuſtration.

If you were pricked with a needle, you would feel pain. Obſerve—

1ſt. That the pain is the effect of the pricking.

2d. That the pain could not exiſt before the pricking.

One thing may be the cauſe of another in different ways, and hence there are different ſorts of cauſes, as *final, inſtrumental, natural, moral.*

Final cauſe is the end or purpoſe for which a thing is done; for example—the *final* cauſe of your application and attention to any purſuit is, *hope of ſucceſs.*

Inſtrumental is, that which does not produce directly and properly the effect, but has itſelf another cauſe; for example—if from motives of charity to ſome indigent family, you give me money to relieve them, relief will be the effect of your charity; but I am only the *inſtrumental* cauſe of that relief; you are the true and primary one.

Natural is, according to the laws of nature: for example—fire is the *natural* cauſe of ſmoke. The ſun is the *natural* cauſe of heat, &c.

If from deſpair a man poiſons himſelf, the effect will be *death*, poiſon will be the

na-

natural cauſe of his death, but deſpair will be the

Moral cauſe.

We may here obſerve, that in all our actions the *moral cauſe* alone makes them good or bad, and that *inſtrumental ones* are of ſecondary conſideration. If you receive a gift or an injury through the medium of a letter or the hands of a ſervant, as the letter or ſervant are but *inſtrumental* cauſes of your pleaſure or diſpleaſure, you will pay little regard to them; your attention will be drawn to the primary and *moral* cauſe, to the perſon who wrote the letter, or who ſent the gift.

An effect may have many *cauſes*; as, for inſtance—when, in walking careleſsly, you hit your foot againſt a ſtone: the fall occaſioned by it has *three* different *cauſes*; the ſtone is the *inſtrumental* one, the weight of your body is the *natural one*, and your inattention will be the *moral one*, at leaſt the only one that may be conſidered as ſuch.

Exercises.

How is the ſun the cauſe of the rainbow?

How is a ſtick the cauſe of a blow?

How is a good behaviour the cauſe of eſteem?

How is fire the cauſe of heat?

In a robber, who has been executed, how many were the cauſes of death?

Solution.

His crime was the *moral cauſe*, *the hangman* the *inſtrumental*, *ſuffocation* the *natural*, *puniſhment and example* the *final*.

What are the *moral* and *final* cauſes of affection to our fellow-creatures?

Anſ. Benevolence and humanity are the *moral* cauſes, and the deſire of being loved is the *final*.

What are the *inſtrumental*, *natural*, *moral*, and *final* cauſes of the death of a man who

who has been ſhot, from motives of perſonal revenge?

Anſ. 1. The gun—2. the ball—3. wickedneſs—4. vengeance ſatisfied.

OF

QUALITIES OR PROPERTIES.

QUALITIES, or *properties*, denote a mode of being, called *modification*; but there are three ſorts of *qualities* you muſt examine in every thing.

When a property adheres ſo much to a thing that you could not conceive that thing without that property, then it is called *eſſential*. As, for example, *rotundity* in a circle is an *eſſential* quality, becauſe without that property you could not

conceive a circle; nobody has the idea of a ſquare circle.

When, on the contrary, that quality can be ſeparated from the thing, or attended it only by chance, then it is called *accidental.* For example, if a ball is white or red, of wood or ivory: theſe are *accidental* qualities, becauſe a ball may be round, and not abſolutely white or red, of wood or of ivory.

Man is eſſentially compounded of ſoul and body, but he is *accidentally* young or old, wiſe or vicious, &c.

Exercises.

The *eſſential* and *accidental* qualities of things may be diſtinguiſhed as follow:

	ESSENTIAL.	ACCIDENTAL.
Water	a liquid	freſh, ſalt, clear, muddy
A watch	to ſhow the hours	gold, ſilver, large, ſmall
Looking-glaſs	to reflect objects	glaſs, or metal, round, oval, ſquare

Bed

	ESSENTIAL.	ACCIDENTAL.
Bed	to lie on	ſoft, hard, down, feathers
Candle	to give light	wax, tallow, or ſperma-ceti
Gun	to ſhoot with	braſs or iron, long or ſhort
Key	to open and ſhut	gold, iron, ſteel, braſs
String	to tie with	ſilk, hempen, red or blue, &c.
Cap	to cover the head	black or white, lace or plain
Church	to meet in for public prayers	new, old, Saxon, Gothic

OF

DEFINITION.

TO have a right idea of a thing, you muſt know how to define it; that is, in what its principal and eſſential qualities conſiſt. A *definition* is the clear explana-

tion of a thing, or the enumeration of its eſſential properties by which it is diſtinguiſhed from another thing.

Three rules muſt be obſerved, in a proper and good definition.

1ſt. It muſt be more plain and intelligible than before it was explained, and ſhould contain no equivocal term or double meaning.

2dly. The thing muſt not be defined by the thing itſelf, or by only changing the words.

3dly. The properties of the thing mentioned muſt eſſentially and excluſively belong to itſelf alone.

Illuſtrations and Application.

If you aſk me what wine is, and I anſwer—

"It is the happy mixture of many
"ſorts of liquefied and intoxicating
"ſalts,"

you are no better informed than before: there-

therefore, that definition contradicts the firſt rule. Agreeably to the three, I ought to ſay—

"Wine *is a liquor extracted from a fruit* "*called grape.*"

What is philoſophy?—"It is the ſcience "that philoſophers teach." Such a definition is not good, becauſe the purpoſe of a definition is to explain a thing by its properties, and here no property is mentioned, the terms only are changed, which contradicts the ſecond rule. The anſwer ſhould be—

It is the inquiry of truth after knowledge, and the love of wiſdom.

What is a window?—"It is a ſquare hole "in the wall." The quality of being ſquare is but accidental; and to be a hole is not to be a window, ſince, by the ſame rule, a door could be a window too. This definition errs againſt the third rule. But if I ſay—

It is an opening made in the wall to admit the light,

it will be exact; and that property of admitting light will not confound the window with the eſſential property of a door, which is to let people paſs in and out.

What is ink?—*It is that which ſerves to write.*

To *ſerve to write* is not the excluſive property of ink, ſince pens and paper are equally uſed. The definition therefore is not ſo proper as if I were to ſay—

Ink is a coloured liquid to write with.

A Grecian philoſopher had in his ſchool defined *man*—

A two-footed animal, that is clothed neither with feathers, nor hairs, nor ſcales.

A cunning wag, to ſhow his maſter the abſurdity of ſuch a definition, brought a picked chicken under his coat to ſchool; and being aſked by the maſter what was concealed there, he anſwered—"A man "that I bought juſt now."—"How! a "man under your coat!"—"Yes, maſ-"ter; look, it is '*a two-footed animal that*

" *is clothed neither with feathers, nor hairs,*
" *nor ſcales*'."

What is *evil?*—If you ſay, *It is a thing that is not perfect in all reſpects*, ſuch a definition is not good, becauſe the thing was more clear before the definition was given, which contradicts the firſt rule.

If you ſay, *Evil is that which is diſagreeable*, ſtill it is not right; becauſe *evil* is aſked here in general, and your anſwer implies only ſome particular ſort of phyſical evil, but does not include the moral one produced by a crime or ſin. Such a definition contradicts the third rule, and it will be better to ſay—

Evil is that which is hurtful to ourſelves, or others.

EXERCISES.

What is a

Town	Houſe	Tree
Church	Phyſician	Architecture
Lie	Surgeon	Star
Almond	Apothecary	Ship

Mountain	Prodigality	Muſic
Farmer	Alms	Picture
Vice	Goſpel	Sculpture
Virtue	Bible	Ambaſſador
Greedineſs	Letter	Friend
Envy	Milk	Flower
Pride	Language	Air
Vanity	Road	Dancing

When a definition is only made by its accidental or remote qualities to the object, and particularly by thoſe which ſeem inconſiſtent with each other; ſuch a definition becomes deſignedly perplexing and unintelligible, and is called an enigma.

OF FALSE JUDGMENT, AND PREJUDICES.

Cauſes of our Errors.

OUR errors have five principal cauſes to which we muſt attend for the inveſtigation of truth—

uſ-

Cuſtom
Example
Vanity and preſumption
Diſlike of reflection
Precipitation in delivering an opinion.

1ſt. Cuſtom.

We often judge of things from no other rule but becauſe we have been accuſtomed to conſider them in that point of view. For example—in our childhood, when the glare of fortune and grandeur dazzles our eyes, we immediately conceive an idea of their rendering the poſſeſſor happy; we then had no experience, nor judgment, to diſcover the contrary, and from that time the ſame falſe notion has ſo grown up with us, that we can only acquire a right idea of the matter by the united efforts of reaſon, wiſdom, and philoſophy.

2d. Example.

We are ſuch mechanical beings, that we not only naturally act, but even think, as thoſe

thoſe do who ſurround us; and, for that reaſon, it is very important to live with people of good ſenſe, good education, and good morals, that they may aſſiſt in enlightening our underſtanding, correcting our judgment, and guiding our reaſon, which is more eaſily effected by example than by precept.

3d. Vanity and Preſumption.

There are many individuals weak enough to think that they cannot be miſtaken in their judgment; ſuch people preſume to talk on every ſubject, in order to appear acquainted with every thing, and on many occaſions expoſe their incompetence, rather than liſten with attention to thoſe who are better informed.

4th. Diſlike of Reflection.

To reflect, as we have already ſtated, is to collect and examine our ideas, and to conſider them attentively; but as ſuch an opera-

operation is too great a labour for trifling and frivolous people, they commonly adopt the judgment of others, rather than be at the trouble of forming an opinion for themſelves. They are mere parrots; they do not think, they repeat; or, as ſome writer expreſſes it, they live upon the thoughts of other people, by retailing their ſentiments.

5*th*. *Precipitation.*

This is the failing of thoſe who ſpeak before they think, or who are always in a hurry: ſuch perſons attend chiefly to appearances, to forms, or the exterior of things, and not to the things themſelves.

All falſe judgments, uttered without examination, or admitted only becauſe others have thought the ſame, are called

Prejudices.

There are various ſorts of *Prejudices*; ſome are peculiar to whole nations, and others

others to people of a certain age, rank, or claſs in life.

The prejudices of *whole nations* ariſe from their education, or cuſtoms, and are ſeldom to be got rid of but by travel, and attending to the polity of different nations; neither judging of the whole by what we obſerve in individuals, nor of individuals by what we obſerve in the whole; ſince this cauſes almoſt every nation to judge wrong of others. For example—becauſe you or I may be generally grave and ſerious, it is not fair to conclude that every native of our country muſt neceſſarily be ſo; nor ought we to pronounce that the vivacity and politeneſs of other nations is folly, or falſehood in diſguiſe, merely becauſe ſuch national characteriſtics are contrary to the temper and manners of our own countrymen.

The prejudices of *infancy* are cloſely adherent to us becauſe they have been implanted in our minds before the reign of reaſon, either by our nurſes, ſchool-fellows,

lows, ſervants, or others, with whom we were converſant in our younger years; it is *then* we imbibe the groſs prejudices of vulgar and ignorant ſuperſtition, and are taught to believe in dreams and omens; to be terrified at the hootings of an owl, or alarmed at the croakings of a raven; to diſcover a winding-ſheet in the overflowings of a candle, or preſage bad weather, becauſe a cat ſits with her tail to the fire. Theſe, and a thouſand ſuch ridiculous prejudices, have often too laſting an influence during the remainder of our lives; and many perſons have had no taſte for reading or ſtudy, merely becauſe they contracted an early notion that ſtudy and application were unpleaſant and irkſome.

The ordinary prejudices of *youth* are to conceive that the public haunts of ſociety, and a conſtant round of diverſions, are the greateſt and trueſt ſources of human enjoyment; that indolent diſſipation is preferable to the ſolid comforts of domeſtic vir-

virtue, or the valuable purſuits of intellectual improvement.

The prejudice of *old age* is to be blindly attached to antiquity; to boaſt of paſt times only; to cenſure, without diſcrimination, the prevailing taſte of modern days, and to regard with envy or intolerance thoſe harmleſs enjoyments and youthful merriments which they can partake of no more.

The prejudices of *nobility* are to think that the virtues and merits of their anceſtors have been transfuſed into their blood, or that wealth and rank alone confer true dignity; and falſely to imagine that their clothes, equipages, and attendants, will obtain from every inferior beholder an irreſiſtible tribute of reſpect and veneration.

It is a *vulgar* and plebeian prejudice to judge of merit by the exterior of things; and therefore the exteriors of grandeur or riches form an illuſion which commonly miſleads: for the outſide of things, which

firſt ſtrikes, is oftentimes different from their inward nature; though we are tempted to judge ſuddenly according to external appearances. We all indeed are too ready to believe that volume valuable which has a ſplendid frontiſpiece; and when we glance at a perſon in ragged garments, we are too apt alſo to form a deſpicable opinion of him, and can with difficulty ſuppoſe him either happy or wiſe; our judgment is ſo ſtrongly biaſſed by outward and ſenſible things.

A mixture of different qualities in the ſame thing is another inducement to judge amiſs. We are ready to be carried away by that quality which makes the firſt or the ſtrongeſt impreſſion upon us, and we judge of the whole object according to that quality; or ſometimes we colour over all the other qualities with that one tincture, whether it be good or bad. For example—when we have a juſt reaſon to admire a man for his *virtues*, we are ſometimes inclined not only to neglect his *weakneſſes*, but

but even to think them amiable. When we have read a book that has many excellent truths in it, or ſentiments correſpondent with our own, we are tempted to approve not only that whole book, but even *all* the writings of that author. It is this prejudice which has rendered many great ſcholars perfect bigots, and inclined them to admire the idle reveries, or vindicate the errors of ſome favourite author.

On the other hand, if an author differs altogether from our fixed opinion on any ſubject, or if we peruſe his work with an unfavourable prepoſſeſſion, even his learning and ability are decried; ſome little blemiſh in any particular part is enough to make us diſguſted with the whole; and we hardly think the writer entitled to the credit of poſſeſſing common ſenſe. This ſort of prejudice is relieved by learning to view the actions and opinions of men with a diſpaſſionate temper and candid interpretation. There is ſcarcely any thing in the world of nature or art, in the world of morality or re-

religion, that is perfectly uniform. There is a mixture of wiſdom and folly, of vice and virtue, of good and evil, both in men and things. We ſhould remember that one man may be vicious and learned, while another has virtue without learning; that many a man thinks admirably well, who cannot expreſs his thoughts with eloquence, while others have a graceful manner of ſpeech, but their thoughts are trifling or impertinent; that ſome excellent paſſages are found in very ſilly books, and ſome ſilly thoughts in books of real value. And here it may be noted, that in common diſcourſe we uſually denominate perſons and things according to the major part of their character. He is to be called a wiſe man who has but few follies; he is a good philoſopher who knows much of human ſcience; and that book ſhould be eſteemed well written which has more of good ſenſe in it than frivolity or unimportance.

The caſual aſſociation of many of our ideas becomes the ſpring of another prejudice

judice or raſh judgment, to which we are ſometimes expoſed. If in our younger years we have taken medicines that were nauſeous, when any medicine whatſoever is afterwards propoſed to us, we immediately judge it nauſeous; our fancy has ſo cloſely joined theſe ideas together, that we know not how to ſeparate them. So a child, who has been let blood, joins the ideas of pain and the ſurgeon together; and he hates the ſight of the ſurgeon, becauſe he thinks of the pain: or, if he has drank a bitter potion, he conceives a bitter idea of the cup which held it, and will drink nothing out of that cup. The beſt relief againſt this prejudice of aſſociation is to conſider whether there be any natural and neceſſary connexion between thoſe ideas, which fancy, cuſtom, or chance, have thus joined together; and if nature has not joined them, let our judgment correct the folly of our imagination, and ſeparate thoſe ideas again. Let reaſon diſſolve the phantom which prejudice has conjured up.

— Though

Though a thing be uniform in its own nature, yet the different lights in which it may be placed, and the different views in which it appears to us, will be apt to excite our miſtaken judgments concerning it. When we ſurvey the miſeries of mankind, and think of the ſorrows of millions, the divine government has a terrible aſpect, and we may be tempted to think hardly even of GOD himſelf: but if we regard the profuſion of his bounty among his creatures on earth, we ſhall have ſo exalted an idea of his *goodneſs*, as to correct our miſconception of his *auſterity*.

Some men dwell entirely upon the promiſes of the goſpel, and think it all mercy. Others, under a melancholy frame, dwell only upon its terrors and its threatenings; and are overwhelmed with the apprehenſion of future miſery. The true method of delivering ourſelves from this fatal prejudice is to view a thing on all ſides, to compare all the various appearances of the ſame

ſame thing with one another, and let each of them have its due weight in the balance of our judgment, before we fully determine our opinion: and if we take the ſame juſt and deliberate ſurvey of the works of the Almighty, in all the diſpenſations of his providence, we ſhall at laſt conclude them to be juſt and good.

There are innumerable prejudices attending mankind in all ranks and conditions of life; but human wiſdom ſhould be exerted in tolerating thoſe of *others*, and in rigidly examining and redreſſing thoſe of our *own*.

Maxims.

Do not ſet up for redreſſing every one's prejudices.

Tolerate and pity thoſe that you cannot cure.

Do not judge of things by their outſide nor in the maſs.

Do

Do not generalize from particular obſervations, nor particularize from general ones.

Common Prejudices.

To judge that the ſky touches the diſtant hills.

To ſuppoſe the ſun and moon to be flat bodies.

To think ſtars ſmaller than the moon.

To imagine the ſtars are not riſen till the ſun is ſet.

To ſay that the moon has a face, and is not larger than it appears.

To conclude that wealth and grandeur confer happineſs.

To think that the exterior performances of devotion may exempt from performing the moral and relative duties of ſocial life.

To believe that beautiful bodies muſt be inhabited by noble minds.

To conceive that odours, colours, &c. are properties belonging to inanimate bodies, and not dependent on our ſenſes.

To admit that honour and fame are the greateſt merits of man.

To ſuppoſe that a wrong is redreſſed when avenged with the blood of an adverſary.

To hold that a man is deſpicable becauſe his parents were of low extraction.

To think that commercial buſineſs is unworthy of a gentleman, and is degrading to him.

To believe that ſtars have ſuch influences upon men as to make them neceſſarily happy or unhappy.

And here we may obſerve, that ſuch a prejudice was almoſt univerſally prevalent a few centuries ago, not only among the common people of various nations, but even among ſome of the moſt diſtinguiſhed philoſophers, who themſelves profeſſed the art of aſtrology. And you will eaſily conceive how ſuch abſurdities were introduced and propagated by the wiſeſt men of antiquity, when you conſider that in all ages *fear* has been the moſt powerful principle

of

of the human mind. But, thanks to the improvements of philoſophy and the pure light of the goſpel, we are freed from a great number of deſpotic prejudices in regard to ſupernatural effects, though we are ſtill labouring under many others ſufficient to moderate our pride, and diminiſh our ſelf-importance.

OF REASON AND COMMON SENSE.

THE word *reaſon* is employed by philoſophers in different ſenſes.

1. It is uſed to ſignify that quality of human nature which diſtinguiſhes man from the inferior animals. Man is called a *reaſonable* being, and the brutes are ſaid to be *irrational*. Reaſon, in this ſenſe, ſeems

to be a general name for all the intellectual powers, as diſtinguiſhed from the ſenſitive part of our conſtitution.

2. Every thing that is called truth is ſaid to be perceived by reaſon; but truths are of different kinds: and therefore the energies of underſtanding, to which they are referred, ought to be called by different names.

3. The power of invention is ſometimes aſcribed to reaſon. Locke tells us, that it is reaſon which diſcovers and arranges the ſeveral intermediate proofs in an argument; an office which is commonly referred, not to reaſon, but to imagination.

4. Reaſon is uſed by thoſe who are moſt accurate, to ſignify that power of the mind by which we draw inferences. It is that faculty which enables us, from relations or ideas that are known, to inveſtigate ſuch as are unknown; and without which we never could proceed in the diſcovery of truth beyond firſt principles.

The

The term *common ſenſe* has alſo ſeveral different ſignifications.

1. Sometimes it ſeems to be ſynonymous with prudence. Thus a man is ſaid to have a large ſtock of common ſenſe who is quick in perceiving remote conſequences, and thence determines at once concerning the propriety of preſent conduct.

2. Common ſenſe, in certain inſtances, ſeems to be confounded with ſome of the powers of taſte. We often meet with perſons of great ſagacity, in the ordinary affairs of life, who, without any bad intention, commit the moſt egregious blunders in regard to decorum; and this we are apt to impute to a defect in common ſenſe: but it ſeems rather to be owing to a defect in ſenſibility or ſympathy; which is, indeed, the foundation of good breeding.

3. Some men are diſtinguiſhed by an uncommon acuteneſs in diſcovering the characters of others. This talent is ſometimes, though improperly, called common ſenſe. It is far from being common. It is

to be found in men who are not remarkable for any other mental excellence; and we often ſee thoſe who in other reſpects are judicious enough, quite deſtitute of it.

4. The term common ſenſe hath, in modern times, been uſed to ſignify that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progreſſive argumentation, but by an inſtantaneous impulſe, derived neither from education nor habit, but from nature, acting independently on our will, and therefore not improperly called *ſenſe*; and acting in a ſimilar manner upon a great majority of mankind, is therefore properly called *common ſenſe*.

Common ſenſe cannot be accounted for by being called the perfection of *reaſon*, nor can the faculty of *reaſon* be reſolved into *common ſenſe*. The latter is the ultimate judge of truth, to which reaſon muſt continually act in ſubordination.

OF

TRUTH.

TRUTH is the conformity of an idea with its object, and conſtitutes the baſis of all our knowledge and of our moral conduct.

The only way of arriving at truth is to conſider the ſolidity of the proofs on which we found our perſuaſion: but as our mind has a certain natural reluctance to reflection, and is apt to judge from appearances, it is no wonder that we are liable to continual error.

Reaſon and underſtanding will ſoon redreſs the error of our ideas, but it is much more difficult to be certain of the truth of our ſentiments and affections, becauſe here the appearances are more deceitful, and our ſenſes aſſiſt the deluſion.

Truth, according to ſome writers, is that which the conſtitution of our nature determines us to believe; and Falſehood is that which the conſtitution of our nature determines us to diſbelieve. Believing and diſbelieving are ſimple acts of the mind. We often believe what we afterwards find to be falſe. Belief continues while we think it true: when we diſcover its falſity, we believe it no longer.

Truths are of different kinds; ſome are *certain*, others only *probable*. The former produce *conviction*, and the latter *aſſent*. All convictions are equally ſtrong; but aſſent admits of various degrees, from *moral certainty*, which is the higheſt degree, through the ſeveral ſtages of *opinion*, to that ſuſpenſe of judgment which is called *doubt*.

The inveſtigation and perception of truth is commonly aſcribed to our rational faculties; and theſe have by ſome been reduced to two, reaſon and judgment; the former being ſuppoſed to be converſant

about

about *certain truths*, the latter chiefly about *probabilities*. But certain truths are not all of the ſame kind, ſome being ſupported by one ſort of evidence, and others by another. The certainty of ſome truths is perceived intuitively; the certainty of others is perceived not intuitively, but in conſequence of a proof.

All truths within our reach are referrible to three claſſes, eſſentially diſtinguiſhed from each other; as—

1. Truths of the ſenſes—2. of the underſtanding—-3. of belief, founded on credible relation.

Examples.

1ſt. This is true; for I ſaw, heard, or felt it, and have the evidence of my ſenſes. Theſe may be called *ſenſible truths*.

2d. This is true; for I am able to demonſtrate it by a proceſs of reaſoning—as, a curve line is longer than a ſtraight one. Theſe are *intellectual truths*.

3d. This is true; for ſeveral creditable perſons have aſſured us of it. Such are *hiſtorical truths*;—as the invaſion of Julius Cæſar, or of William the Conqueror, the diſcovery of America, &c. The demolition of the Baſtille is a truth of the *third* claſs for us, and one of the *firſt* for thoſe who ſaw it effected; but all equally produce *evidence* or ſufficient conviction of the facts.

OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.

THE operation of our mind in judging, is to compare two or more ideas together, and to infer ſome conſequence, which is called *judgment* (ſee page 11). If it ſo unites or ſeparates them, as in reality things are, it is *right judgment*.

The

The facility of conſidering many things under different aſpects, conſtitutes what we call a man of *judgment*.

To perceive quickly the ſmalleſt and niceſt relations which things have with one another, makes *ſagacity*; and this faculty (particularly in point of morals) eminently diſtinguiſhes women above men.

The facility of receiving ideas, or perceptions of things, is what makes the man of *underſtanding*.

Mr. *Locke*, who has written very largely and learnedly on theſe matters, ſays, that to know in what thoſe things reſemble which apparently differ, or in what thoſe differ which apparently agree, is the higheſt exerciſe of human underſtanding.

A firm aſſent given to ideas before there is any clear perception whether they agree or diſagree, is the cauſe of many *falſe judgments*, or miſtakes among men.

OF THE RELATION OR DIFFERENT VIEWS OF *THINGS.*

THE different views under which we may conſider a thing are ſix:

1ſt. as to *matter*
2d. —— *dimenſion*
3d. —— *quality*
4th. —— *quantity*
5th. —— *time*
6th. —— *place.*

Two perſons, therefore, examining the ſame thing, will form a different judgment, if they have not conſidered it in the ſame view. For example—Of an offence committed by a young perſon againſt his ſuperior,

rior, perhaps you will think very lightly, conſidering the age of the offender, and the conceived inſignificance of the offence; while I may regard it as criminal, in reſpect of the quality of the perſon offended, and the idea it has excited of habitual diſreſpect.

There is not a ſingle object in nature which, when compared to another, has not ſome relation or correſpondence; nor are any two things ſo perfectly alike as not to have ſome material point of difference.

To find in what things differ or reſemble, we muſt attend to their *eſſential* properties, and *accidental* agreement or diſagreement. For example—Under the quality of ſhowing the hours, a clock and a watch are *eſſentially* the ſame; but conſidering their matter and dimenſions, they *accidentally* differ.

A pint of milk and a pint of rum *accidentally* agree as to quantity, but they *eſſentially* differ as to quality.

Ex-

Exercises

Upon the finding of Reſemblance or Difference in Things.

In what particulars do the following differ or agree?

A bottle of wine and one of water
A giant and a dwarf
Nature and habit
A child and a parrot
Detraction and ſlander
Vice and virtue
Emulation and ambition
Sleep and death
A thief and a liar
A ſnake and a flatterer.

OF

CERTITUDE.

How to diſcern if a Thing is true or falſe.

WHEN any thing is propoſed to our judgment, the mind conſiders whether it agrees or diſagrees with ſome eſtabliſhed notion; and if it does not agree with it, we pronounce that the thing is *falſe*. For example—If any body tells me of a *milk* river, or a *ſugar* mountain, theſe two ideas being contrary to my antecedent notion of the production of thoſe two ſubſtances, one in the animal, and the other in the vegetable world, then I judge that the information is *falſe*.

Whatſoever the propoſition be, our anſwer cannot be made but in three different modes.

1ſt,

1ſt, In *affirming*—when the thing is evident.

2d, In *denying*—when we ſee its impoſſibility.

3d, In *doubting*—when an equal number and weight of reaſons appear for and againſt, or when we have no reaſons to judge by.

Finally, when the thing is neither evidently true, nor evidently falſe, it is called *probable*.

Uncertain propoſitions are called *opinions*.

Evidence is ſo clear and diſtinct a manifeſtation of truth, that, whatever it may be, we cannot withhold our aſſent to it; as for example—

The whole is greater than any part.

Rome ſtill exiſts.

It does not rain.

As *evidence* is obtained by three different channels, there are, therefore, three different ſorts of *certitudes*—

Moral—founded on human teſtimony;

Phyſical—on the teſtimony of our own ſenſes;

Metaphyſical—on the conſciouſneſs or mental feeling, which forces us to confeſs the thing is true or falſe.

Exercises

On the Claſſification of Certitudes.

The exiſtence of God
The exiſtence of America
That $2 + 2 = 4$
Graſs is green
Fire will burn
Sugar is ſweet
Fear is troubleſome
A part is leſs than the whole
No effect without a cauſe.

The certitude founded upon the teſtimony of our ſenſes and of other men, requires three conditions, not to be led into error:

error: the teſtimony muſt be *conſtant, uniform, diſintereſted.*

Therefore we are *morally* ſure of the exiſtence of America, becauſe we have been told of it *conſtantly* and *uniformly* by all ſorts of people deſtitute of the intereſt of deceiving us; and this makes a great part of our knowledge, there being a thouſand things which we believe upon the authority of thoſe who have ſpoken or written about them; and as theſe perſons are many or few, and of more or leſs wiſdom and credit, ſo our faith is ſtronger or weaker.

I am *phyſically* ſure of your exiſtence, becauſe both my eyes and ears have told me ſo *conſtantly* and *uniformly*: but if, in glancing my eye at a crowd, I think I ſaw you, I have not ſufficient evidence of the fact, except you have ſince told me, that at ſuch a time you actually were in ſuch a place: this circumſtance is requiſite.

We are ſure that all that we ſee, or hear, or feel, *conſtantly, uniformly*, is truly exiſtent, becauſe, in ſuch caſes, we feel within

us

us a certain force and neceſſity that impels us to judge that it is true; now that neceſſity of judging can only ariſe from Reaſon, Conſcience, and God, who cannot deceive us.

For *denying* a thing, it is neceſſary that its exiſtence ſhould be inconſiſtent either with the ordinary laws of nature, or the general cuſtoms of men, or the notions we have already acquired: as for example—we may deny that

Iron can float on water;
Liars and robbers can be faithful;
A ſquare could be contrived round.

But it would not be reaſonable to deny a thing only becauſe it is not known to us, or becauſe we have not ſeen it: for example—it would be wrong to deny that the ſea is convex, becauſe we have only ſeen the repreſentation of it in a picture; or that the moon cannot be a world like our own, becauſe we cannot diſcern its inhabitants.

The

The motives for *doubting* of a thing are—1ſt, when we have as many reaſons for, as againſt it's exiſtence; or, 2dly, when we have no ſufficient reaſon for either. Example—Geographers aſſert, that there is a portion of land near each pole, becauſe of the vaſt quantity of floating ice there; which ice, they ſay, muſt proceed from rivers. This is a reaſon that inclines me to believe in polar lands: but ſince Captain Cook ſailed in that quarter of the globe, and has not diſcovered any ſuch land, this is an equal reaſon againſt my belief, and I am therefore obliged to *doubt*, and to ſuſpend my judgment, for the want of fuller information.

Again—general report ſays, that the Emperor of China is juſt dead. As I have no reaſon ſtrong enough for believing or denying it, I *doubt*.

Some things are not only *doubtful*, but *improbable*:

As—That a miſer ſhould be generous
That it ſhould be dark at noon-day.

Of

Of Probabilities.

A thing is *probable* when we have ſtrong reaſons for believing it, but not ſtrong enough to be deemed evidence. *Probability*, therefore, is a *half-certitude*, if the term may be allowed. Take, for an inſtance of probability, the population of planets, ſince ſuch an opinion is agreeable both to the laws of nature and the omnipotence of God. Planets appear to be prodigious maſſive bodies illuminated by the ſun; and many moons, like our own, are ſeen to move around them. Now, as there is nothing uſeleſs in nature, and as thoſe moons do not enlighten our globe, and are ſeen only with teleſcopes, they are evidently not made for us, and are, moſt likely, contrived for the ſame purpoſe as our moon, to enlighten thoſe ſpherical bodies round which they revolve. Theſe are ſtrong reaſons for aſſenting to ſuch a belief;

lief; but as they do not amount to evidence, we can only be of opinion it is *probable* that the planets are worlds like our own.

Exercises

On the proper Uſe of judging as to Certitude, Probability, *&c.*

You will die
You will die to-morrow
You will live to 80 years of age
It rains now in Spain
Next winter will be cold
Muſic was known before painting—poetry before muſic
The ſun will not ſhine to-morrow
You are younger than your father
Your ſiſter is older than you
America is larger than Europe
Corſica is ſmaller than England.

OF

REASONING,

IN

SPEAKING AND WRITING.

REASONING conſiſts in inferring ſome truth from a preceding truth.

This firſt truth is called a *propoſition*, or *principle*; and the ſecond inferred from it is called a *conſequence*. For example—when I ſay, *I am hungry*, I utter a ſimple truth, and do not reaſon; but if I ſay, *I am hungry, and therefore ſhall enjoy my dinner*, this is reaſoning.

A *principle*, or *propoſition*, is a judgment compoſed of two ideas; one expreſſing a *ſubject*, and the other a *quality*, we affirm, or ſuppoſe, belonging to the ſubject: and

of

of a third word, ſhowing the connexion that our mind conceives between them—as, In *God is good.* *God* is the ſubject, *good*, the attribute, *is*, the connexion.

There are ſeveral important rules for right reaſoning.

Firſt Rule.

The *conſequence* muſt differ from the *principle*, and yet it muſt be contained in it, and neceſſarily flow from it.

If I ſay, *I am hungry, therefore it is dinner-time*, the reaſoning will be defective, the conſequence not being contained in the propoſition; and if I ſay, *I am hungry, therefore I have appetite*, the reaſoning will likewiſe be defective, or, rather, there will be no reaſoning at all, ſince the conſequence will be the ſame as the principle, the words being only changed.

EXERCISES

On the firſt Rule. To infer ſome Truth from given Principles.

God is juſt
I am young
I love nobody
The wind blows eaſt
This man is a liar
I know not myſelf
Here is a rainbow
He has more wit than judgment
I am fond of learning.

EXERCISES

On Reaſonings failing in the firſt Rule. To be corrected.

The ſun ſhines, therefore it is twelve o'clock.

You are a Londoner, therefore you were born in London.

The ſun is hot, therefore it is not cold.

I am naturally greedy, therefore it is not my fault.

Second Rule.

The conſequence is always falſe when the principle is falſe; and if you grant the firſt propoſition, you muſt grant the ſecond too.

Examples.

The whole creation has created itſelf, therefore there is no God.

I cannot help ſtealing, therefore I am not guilty.

Our ſouls die with the body, therefore we have nothing to hope or fear from death.

I am naturally fond of muſic, therefore I ſhall not keep that taſte long.

Young people are never wrong, therefore they ſhould never be puniſhed.

Third Rule.

If the principle is general or particular, the conſequence muſt be general or particular.

Exam-

Example.

All men are mortal, therefore all ſhall die.

EXERCISES.

Few men govern their paſſions, therefore few are virtuous.

Some women are giddy and volatile, therefore all are giddy and volatile.

I have ſeen four or five Engliſhmen very corpulent, therefore the whole nation muſt be ſo.

Spaniards are in general proud and ſuperſtitious, therefore each individual is ſo.

I know a phyſician who has killed a patient, therefore all phyſicians are homicides.

Fourth Rule.

When the principle is doubtful, the conſequence cannot be certain.

Example.

The wind is variable, therefore we cannot depend upon any ſettled, fair, or rainy weather.

Exercises.

Fortune is inconſtant, therefore I am ſure of being rich.

It is probable that each ſtar is a ſun, and each planet a world; therefore it is certain they are ſo.

It is uncertain whether I ſhall live twenty years, therefore I ſhall be dead before that time.

The ſea is dangerous, therefore I ſhall periſh if I embark upon it.

There are many diſeaſes concealed from the ableſt phyſicians, and remedies have often proved unſucceſsful; therefore phyſic is a vain ſcience.

In common diſcourſe, theſe forms of reaſoning are not always uſed, nor is every con-

conſequence expreſſed by the word *therefore*; but the conſequence is often placed firſt, with the conjunctions *for* or *becauſe*; as when we ſay, *I am much fatigued, becauſe I have walked much*, it is the ſame as if I ſay, *I have walked much*, therefore *I am fatigued*—*You will be eaſily impoſed upon, for you are very young*; which implies—you are very young, *therefore* you have no experience.

Fifth Rule.

The principle muſt not contain any ambiguous or equivocal expreſſion, which would perplex, and cauſe a wrong judgment: as for example—if it is argued,

All that exiſts comes from God, therefore he is the author of evil—.

It is not wrong to kill a man in ſome caſes, therefore I may kill myſelf—.

To ſuch poſitions we muſt not anſwer by affirming or denying; but we ſhould try to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral points under which the firſt propoſition may be viewed, and

grant it in the ſenſe where it is true, that we may deny it in that where it is falſe: therefore we may anſwer—

All created beings are made by God, but evil proceeds from the free will of man.

It is not wrong to kill a man lawfully, in ſelf-defence; but to deſtroy ourſelves is contrary to every ordinance, human and divine.

Exercises

For diſtinguiſhing the double Reſpect of Things.

Two halves make a whole—therefore the half of two men makes a whole man.

You ſtill have what you have not loſt—therefore you have a fortune.

Every man ſhall die—therefore you, who are not a man, ſhall not die.

Every man may diſpoſe of his property as he pleaſes—therefore your father may throw you into the river.

Pre-

Preſumptuous and ſelf-confident people never appear to be wrong—therefore they ſhould never be puniſhed.

All the preceding arguments, or modes of reaſoning, are only compoſed of a ſingle propoſition; but it often happens that a ſentence contains two or more depending from one another.

Thoſe ſentences which are made up of three propoſitions, are called *ſyllogiſms*—thoſe which are made of two or more ſingle ſyllogiſms, are called *compound ſyllogiſms.*

Of Syllogisms.

A *ſyllogiſm* is a ſentence or argument made up of three propoſitions, ſo diſpoſed as that the laſt is neceſſarily inferred from thoſe which go before. In the conſtitution of a ſyllogiſm two things may be conſidered—viz. the *matter* and the *form* of it. The *matter* of a ſyllogiſm is made up of three propoſitions, and theſe are made up

of three ideas or terms variouſly joined. The three terms are named the major, the minor, and the middle. The major and minor terms are called the extreme. The middle term is the third idea invented and diſpoſed in ſuch a manner as to ſhow the connexion between the major and minor term in the concluſion; for which reaſon, the middle term itſelf is ſometimes called the argument.

The *form* of a ſyllogiſm is the framing and diſpoſing of the premiſes according to art, on juſt principles of reaſoning, and the regular inference of the concluſion from them.

The *art of reaſoning*, or inferring one thing from another, is generally expreſſed and known by the particle *therefore*, when the argument is formed according to the rules of art.—Example. If the queſtion be, whether God muſt be worſhipped, we ſeek a third idea, ſuppoſe the idea of a Creator, and ſay—

Our

Our Creator muſt be worſhipped.
God is our creator;
Therefore God muſt be worſhipped.

The third propoſition which is drawn from the *premiſes* is the *concluſion*, wherein the queſtion itſelf is anſwered; and this muſt be either in the *affirmative* or *negative*.

The foundation of all *affirmative concluſions* is laid in this general truth, that ſo far as two propoſed ideas agree to any third idea, they agree alſo among themſelves. Thus—

The character of *Creator* agrees to *God*,
And *worſhip* agrees to a *Creator*;
Therefore, *worſhip* agrees to *God*.

The foundation of all *negative concluſions* is this, that where one of the two propoſed ideas agrees with the third idea, and the other diſagrees with it, they muſt needs diſagree alſo with one another. As for example—

If no ſinners are happy,
And if angels are happy,
Then angels are not ſinners.

The figure of a ſyllogiſm is the proper diſpoſition of the middle term with the parts in queſtion.

Examples.

We muſt love our benefactor;
God is our benefactor;
Therefore we muſt love God.

Flat bodies reflect light in an oppoſite direction;
The moon reflects it in all directions;
Therefore the moon is not a flat body.

Every wicked man is miſerable;
All tyrants are wicked men;
Therefore all tyrants are miſerable.

He that is always in fear is not happy;
Covetous men are always in fear;
Therefore covetous men are not happy.

What-

Whatever furthers our ſalvation is good for us;
Some afflictions further our ſalvation;
Therefore ſome afflictions are good for us.

No liar is fit to be believed;
Every good Chriſtian is fit to be believed;
Therefore no good Chriſtian is a liar.

Thoſe are called *complex* ſyllogiſms, in which the middle term is not connected with the whole ſubject, but is intermingled and compared with them by parts, or in a more confuſed manner in different forms of ſpeech. This ſort of argument is confeſſed to be entangled and irregular; yet there is a great variety of arguments uſed in books and in common life, which muſt be ranked under this head.

Examples.

One hailſtone never falls alone;
But a hailſtone fell juſt now;
Therefore others fell with it.

The ſun is a ſenſeleſs being;
The Perſians worſhipped the ſun;
Therefore the Perſians worſhipped a ſenſeleſs being.

Moſes wrote before the Trojan war;
The firſt Greek hiſtorians wrote after the Trojan war;
Therefore the firſt Greek hiſtorians wrote after Moſes.

The father always lived in London;
The ſon always lived with the father;
Therefore the ſon always lived in London.

Now the force of all theſe arguments is ſo evident and concluſive, that, though the form of the ſyllogiſm be ever ſo irregular, yet we are ſure the inferences are juſt and true; for the premiſes do really contain the concluſion that is deduced from them, which is a never-failing teſt of a true ſyllogiſm.

Thoſe are called *conjunctive* ſyllogiſms wherein one of the premiſes, namely the major,

major, has diſtinct parts, which are joined by a conjunction, or ſome ſuch particle of ſpeech. It is hardly poſſible to fit any ſhort definition to include all the kinds of them.

Examples.

If atheiſts are in the right,
Then the world exiſts without a cauſe;
But the world does not exiſt without a cauſe;
Therefore atheiſts are not in the right.

If there be no God,
Then the world does not diſcover creating wiſdom;
But the world does diſcover creating wiſdom;
Therefore there is a God.

It is either ſpring, ſummer, autumn, or winter;
But it is not ſpring, autumn, or winter;
Therefore it is ſummer.

Gulo cannot make a dinner without fleſh and fiſh;
There was no fiſh to be had to-day;
Therefore Gulo cannot make a dinner.

Genius muſt join with ſtudy, to make a great man;
Quintus ſtudies hard, but has no genius;
Therefore Quintus will never be a great man.

Of Compound Syllogiſms.

We properly call thoſe *compound* ſyllogiſms which are formed of two or more ſingle ſyllogiſms, and may be reſolved into them.

The firſt of this kind contains the proof of the major and minor, or both, before it draws the concluſion. This is often uſed in writing, in public ſpeaking, and in common converſation.

Example.

Sickneſs may be good for us, for it weans us from the pleaſures of life, and makes us think of dying;

But we are uneaſy under ſickneſs, which appears by our impatience and complaints;

Therefore we are uneaſy ſometimes under that which is good for us.

A ſecond ſort of reaſoning is, when two or more ſyllogiſms are ſo connected together, that the concluſion of the former is the major or minor of the following.

Example.

Blood cannot think;
But the ſoul of man thinks:
Therefore the ſoul of man is not blood;
But the ſoul of a brute is his blood, according to the ſcripture:
Therefore the ſoul of man is different from the ſoul of a brute.

A *di-*

A *dilemma* is an argument which divides the whole into all its parts or members, by a disjunctive propoſition, and then infers ſomething concerning each part, which is finally inferred concerning the whole. Inſtances of this are frequent.

Examples.

In this life we muſt either indulge our vicious paſſions or reſiſt them:
To indulge them will bring ſin and ſorrow;
To reſiſt them is laborious and painful:
Therefore we cannot be perfectly free from ſorrow or pain in this life.

If you do not improve in your ſtudies, it is either from want of capacity or inclination:
If from want of capacity, you are wrong to waſte your parents' money;
If from want of inclination, you are wrong to waſte your own time:
Therefore you are wrong either with reſpect to your parents or to yourſelf.

The

The eſtabliſhed religion of England is true or falſe:

If true, we ſhall be puniſhed for not fulfilling its duties;

If falſe, we cannot be puniſhed for fulfilling them with an upright intention:

Therefore, in both caſes, it is our intereſt to fulfil them.

A *dilemma* becomes faulty in three ways: 1. When the members of the diviſion are not well oppoſed, or not fully enumerated. 2. When what is aſſerted concerning each part is not juſt. 3. When it may be retorted with equal force upon him who utters it.

An inſtance of the latter was employed againſt the celebrated Protagoras, a Grecian philoſopher. Protagoras had taught Evathus the art of pleading, in conſideration of a ſum of money he was to receive from his ſcholar the firſt day he gained any cauſe in court. After a conſiderable time, Protagoras goes to law with Evathus for the mo-

money, and argues in this manner:—

Either I ſhall gain the cauſe, or you will gain it:
If I gain it, you muſt pay me according to the ſentence of the judge;
If you gain it, you muſt pay me according to your agreement;
Therefore, whether the cauſe goes for or againſt me, you muſt pay me the money.

But Evathus thus retorted the argument upon his maſter:—

Either I ſhall gain the cauſe, or loſe it;
If I gain it, nothing will be due to you, according to the ſentence of the judge;
If I loſe it, nothing will be due to you, according to our agreement;
Therefore, whether I loſe or gain the cauſe, nothing will be due to you.

A dilemma is uſually deſcribed as though it always proved the abſurdity, inconvenience,

ence, or unreaſonableneſs of ſome opinion or practice; and this is the moſt common deſign of it: but it is plain, that it may alſo be uſed to prove the truth or advantage of any thing propoſed; as—

In heaven we ſhall either have deſires, or not;
If we have no deſires, then we have full ſatisfaction;
If we have deſires, they ſhall be ſatisfied as faſt as they ariſe:
Therefore, in heaven we ſhall be completely ſatisfied.

A *ſorites* is, when ſeveral middle terms are choſen to connect one another ſucceſſively in ſeveral propoſitions, till the laſt propoſition connects its predicate, or affirmative propoſition, with the firſt ſubject.

Ex-

Examples.

Revengeful men have their minds often uneasy;
Uneasy minds are a plague to themselves;
Now to be one's own plague is folly in the extreme;
Therefore revengeful men are extreme fools.

Alexander, when a child, governed his mother;
His mother governed king Philip;
King Philip governed the Grecians;
The Grecians governed all Asia;
Therefore Alexander, when a child, governed all Asia.

St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, has given an instance of this sort of argument, if it were reduced to exact form:

Whom

Whom he foreknew, thoſe he predeſtinated;
Whom he predeſtinated, he called;
Whom he called, he juſtified;
Whom he juſtified, he glorified;
Therefore, whom he foreknew, he glorified.

The preceding four kinds of ſyllogiſms may be called *redundant*, becauſe they have more than three propoſitions: but there is one ſort of ſyllogiſm which is defective, and is called an *enthymem*; becauſe only the concluſion with one of the premiſes is expreſſed, while the other is ſuppoſed and reſerved in the mind.

Examples.

There is no true religion without good morals;
Therefore a knave cannot be truly religious.

It is our duty to love our neighbour as ourſelves;

Therefore there are few who perform their duty.

Note. This is the moſt common ſort of argument amongſt mankind, both in ſpeaking and writing; for it would take up too much time, and too much retard diſcourſe, to draw out all our arguments in logical mood and figure. Beſide, mankind love to have ſo much compliment paid to their underſtandings, as to ſuppoſe that they know the major and minor, which is ſuppreſſed and implied, when you pronounce the other premiſe and the concluſion.

Uſe of Syllogiſms.

Any diſcourſe or compoſition that contains a connected reaſoning, is but a ſingle ſyllogiſm defined, divided, and demonſtrated. The firſt diviſions of the work are employed in explaining the general ſubject, the middle ones in demonſtrating the

the truth of the qualities or properties aſſigned to it; and the laſt contain the conſequences drawn from the whole. It is impoſſible, therefore, to judge properly of any ſpecies of compoſition, if we are not able to diſſect and analyſe the whole maſs, to reduce it to its firſt elements or principles, and to compare them with the concluſion or conſequence; which will be effected by reducing the work into a ſyllogiſm. It will then be eaſy to diſcover the fallacy of defective reaſoning or rhetorical flouriſhes, by ſtripping off the covering of wit or ſophiſtry, and viewing the matter in its plain and ſimple ſtate.

If a ſyllogiſm agrees with the rules given for the conſtruction and regulation of it, it is called a true argument: if it diſagrees with theſe rules, it is a falſe argument; but when a falſe argument puts on the maſk and appearance of a true one, it then becomes a fallacy, or *ſophiſm*.

Of Sophisms.

From truth, nothing can really follow but what is *true*; therefore, whenever we find a *falſe concluſion* drawn from premiſes which ſeem to be true, there muſt be ſome fault in the deduction or inference; or elſe one of the premiſes is not true, in the ſenſe in which it is uſed in that argument. Diſputers, when they grow warm, are inclined to run into *fallacy*: they dreſs up the opinion of their opponent as they pleaſe, and aſcribe ſentiments to him which he does not acknowledge; and when, with oſtentatious parade, they have attacked and deſtroyed the images of ſtraw, of their own making, they triumph over their opponent, as though they had entirely confuted his opinion.

The way to prevent *fallacy* is, by keeping the eye fixed on the preciſe point of diſpute, and neither wandering from it ourſelves, nor ſuffering our antagoniſt to wan-

wander from it, or ſubſtitute any thing elſe in its room.

All arguments that wear an appearance of truth, and yet lead into error, are called *ſophiſms.* Logicians have divided *ſophiſms* into various kinds:

1. The firſt ſort of ſophiſm is called *a miſtake of the queſtion:* that is, when ſomething elſe is proved which has not any neceſſary connexion with the thing inquired, and conſequently gives no determination to the inquiry, though it may ſeem at firſt ſight to determine it; as—if any ſhould conclude, that St. Paul was not a native Jew, by proving that he was born a Roman: or, if they ſhould pretend to determine that he was neither Roman nor Jew, by proving that he was born at Tarſus, in Cilicia. Theſe ſophiſms are refuted by ſhowing that all theſe three may be true; for he was born of Jewiſh parents, in the city of Tarſus, and, by ſome peculiar privilege granted to his parents, or his native city, he was born a denizen of Rome.

Or if the queſtion be propoſed, whether exceſs of wine can be hurtful to him that drinks it, and the ſophiſter ſhould prove that it revives the ſpirits, exhilarates the ſoul, gives a man courage, and makes him ſtrong and active; and then takes it for granted that he has proved his point; the reſpondent may eaſily ſhow that though wine can do all this—yet it may be finally hurtful both to the ſoul and body of him who drinks it to exceſs.

2. The next ſophiſm is called *a ſuppoſition of what is not granted:* that is, when any propoſition is proved by the ſame propoſition in other words, or by ſomething that is equally uncertain and diſputable; as—if a Papiſt undertake to prove that his religion is the only Catholic religion; and is derived from Chriſt and his apoſtles; becauſe it agrees with the doctrine of all the fathers of the church and all the Chriſtian world throughout all ages: whereas, this is the great point in diſpute, whether their religion

gion does agree with that of all the ancient and primitive Chriſtians, or no.

3. That ſort of ſophiſm which is called *a circle*, is very ſimilar to the above. The Papiſts are famous at this ſort of fallacy—as, when they prove the ſcripture to be the word of God by the infallible authority of their church; and when they are called to ſhow the infallible authority of their church, they prove it by the ſcripture.

4. A fourth kind of ſophiſm is called the *aſſignation of a falſe cauſe*. The moderns, as well as the ancients, fall into this fallacy, when they poſitively aſſign the reaſons of natural appearances, without ſufficient experiments to prove them. Aſtrologers are overrun with this ſort of fallacy, when they deduce the cauſe of the various occurrences of the lives of men from the various poſitions of the ſtars and planets, which they call aſpects. When comets and eclipſes of the ſun and moon are conſtrued to ſignify the fate of princes, or the revolution of ſtates, with famine, and ca-

lamities of every kind, it is a fallacy that belongs to this rank of ſophiſms.

There is ſcarcely any thing more common in human life than this ſort of deceitful argument. If any two accidental events happen to concur, one is preſently made the cauſe of the other: as, when holy Job was viſited with uncommon miſeries, his friends inferred that he was a moſt heinous criminal, and charged him with aggravated guilt as the cauſe of his calamities; till God himſelf, by a voice from heaven, ſolved this uncharitable ſophiſm, and cleared his ſervant Job of the unjuſt accuſation. How frequent is it among men to charge that upon the premeditated malice of a neighbour which aroſe merely from accident or from an unguarded temper; and, on the other hand, when we have a mind to excuſe ourſelves, we practiſe the ſame ſophiſm, and impute that to haſty inadvertence which, perhaps, was owing to deſigned malevolence. What is really done from neceſſity, we ſometimes

aſ-

aſcribe to choice; and what was really deſired and choſen, we at other times aſcribe to neceſſity. It is extremely difficult for us to determine, with certainty, what are the ſecret ſprings and inward motives of every man's conduct; and therefore we ſhould be cautious in paſſing judgment, where the caſe is not exceedingly evident: and if we ſhould miſtake, let it always be rather on the charitable, than on the cenſorious ſide.

5. Another ſophiſm is, when we pronounce concerning the *eſſential properties* of any ſubject according to ſomething which is merely *accidental* to it. This is alſo very frequent in human life; as, if opium or bark has been imprudently or unſucceſſfully adminiſtered, and the patient has received an injury, ſome weak nurſes will pronounce abſolutely againſt the uſe of bark or opium in any caſe whatever. So wine has been the *accidental* occaſion of drunkenneſs and quarrels. Learning and printing may have been the *accidental*

cauſes of ſedition in a ſtate; the reading of the Bible has *accidentally* been abuſed, to promote hereſies or pernicious doctrines; and, for theſe reaſons, they have all been pronounced *eſſential evils*. But how unjuſt is it to proſcribe the uſe of a thing from the abuſe of it; and how unreaſonable are the inferences deduced from ſuch ſophiſtical premiſes!

6. The next ſophiſm borders upon the former; and that is, when we argue from that which is true in *particular circumſtances*, to prove the ſame thing true *abſolutely*, *ſimply*, and *abſtracted from all circumſtances*:—as,

That which is bought of the butcher is eaten for dinner:

Now, raw meat is bought of the butcher;

Therefore raw meat is eaten for dinner.

Livy writes improbabilities, when he deſcribes prodigies and omens;

There-

Therefore Livy's Roman Hiſtory is not to be believed in any thing.

This ſort of ſophiſm has its reverſe alſo; as, when we argue from that which is true ſimply and abſolutely, to prove the ſame thing true in all particular caſes whatſoever—as,

The Goſpel directs us to do unto others what we wiſh ſhould be done to ourſelves;
But a hangman does to another what he would not wiſh ſhould be done to himſelf:
Therefore a hangman ſins againſt the Goſpel.

This laſt ſpecies of ſophiſm is eaſily ſolved, by ſhowing the difference between things in their abſolute nature, and the ſame things ſurrounded with peculiar circumſtances, and conſidered in regard to eſ-

pecial times, places, perſons, and occaſions.

7. The ſophiſm of *compoſition* is when we infer any thing concerning ideas in a *compounded* ſenſe, which is only true in a *divided* ſenſe. And when it is ſaid, in the Goſpel, that "Chriſt made the blind to "ſee, the deaf to hear, and the lame to "walk," we are not to infer from hence that Chriſt performed contradictions, but that thoſe who were blind *before*, were made to ſee—thoſe who were deaf before, to hear, &c. So, when the ſcripture aſſures us—"the worſt of ſinners may be ſaved," it ſignifies only, that they who *have been* the worſt of ſinners may repent and be ſaved, not that they ſhall be ſaved in their ſins. Or if any one ſhould argue thus—two and three are even and odd; five are two and three: *therefore*, five are even and odd—here, that is falſely inferred, concerning two and three *in union*, which is only true of them *divided*.

8. The

8. The ſophiſm of *diviſion* is, when we infer the ſame thing concerning ideas in a *divided* ſenſe, which is only true in a *compounded* ſenſe; as if we ſhould pretend to prove that every ſoldier in the Grecian army put 100,000 Perſians to flight, *becauſe* the Grecian ſoldiers did ſo. Or, if a man ſhould argue thus—five is one number; two and three are five: *therefore* two and three are one number.

9. The laſt ſort of ſophiſm ariſes from our abuſe of the *ambiguity* of *words*; which is the largeſt and moſt extenſive kind of fallacy; and ſeveral of the former fallacies might be reduced to this head.

When the words or phraſes are plainly equivocal, they are called ſophiſms of *equivocation*; as if we ſhould argue thus:—He that puts forth a book into the light, deſires it to be read; he that throws a book into the fire, puts it into the light; therefore, he that throws a book into the fire deſires it to be read.

This ſophiſm, as well as the foregoing, and all of the like nature, are ſolved by ſhowing the different ſenſes of the words, terms, or phraſes. Here *light*, in the major propoſition, ſignifies the public view of the world; in the minor, it ſignifies the brightneſs of flame and fire; and therefore the ſyllogiſm has four terms, or rather, it has no middle term, and proves nothing.

But where ſuch groſs equivocations and ambiguities appear in arguments, there is little danger of impoſing upon ourſelves or others. The greateſt danger, and which we are perpetually expoſed to in reaſoning, is, where the two ſenſes, or ſignifications of one term, are near akin, and not plainly diſtinguiſhed, and yet they are really ſufficiently different in their ſenſe to lead us into great miſtakes, if we are not watchful: and indeed the greater part of controverſies in civil life ariſe from the different ſenſes that are put upon words, and the different ideas which are included in them.

General Teſts of true SYLLOGISMS, *and Methods of ſolving all* SOPHISMS.

Beſide the ſpecial deſcription of *true ſyllogiſms* and *ſophiſms* already given, and the rules by which the one is framed and the other refuted, there are two general methods of reducing all ſyllogiſms whatſoever to a teſt of the truth or falſehood.

I. The firſt teſt is, that the premiſes muſt, at leaſt implicitly, contain the concluſion; or that, one of the premiſes muſt contain the concluſion, and the other muſt ſhow that the concluſion is contained in it: as—

Whoever is a ſlave to his natural inclinations is miſerable:
The wicked man is a ſlave to his natural inclinations;
Therefore the wicked man is miſerable.

Here it is evident that the major propoſition contains the concluſion; for, under the general character of a ſlave to natural inclinations, a wicked man is contained or included; and the minor propoſition declares it; whence the concluſion is evidently deduced, that the wicked man is miſerable.

In many *affirmative* ſyllogiſms we may ſuppoſe either the major or the minor to contain the concluſion, and the other to ſhow it; for there is no great difference: but in *negative* ſyllogiſms it is the negative propoſition that contains the concluſion, and the affirmative propoſition ſhows it:—as,

Every wiſe man maſters his paſſions:
No angry man maſters his paſſions;
Therefore no angry man is wiſe.

Here it is more natural to ſuppoſe the minor to be the containing propoſition: it is the minor implicitly denies wiſdom concerning an angry man, becauſe maſtering

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the paſſions is included in wiſdom, and the major ſhows it.

This rule may be applied to *complex* and *conjunctive*, as well as *ſimple* ſyllogiſms.

II. The ſecond teſt is this; as the terms in every ſyllogiſm are uſually repeated twice, ſo they muſt be taken preciſely in the ſame ſenſe in both places; for the greateſt part of miſtakes that ariſe in forming ſyllogiſms is derived from ſome little difference in the ſenſe of one of the terms in the two parts of the ſyllogiſm wherein it is uſed. Let us conſider the following ſophiſms:

1. It is a ſin to kill a man;
   A murderer is a man;
   Therefore it is a ſin to kill a murderer.

Here the word kill, in the firſt propoſition, ſignifies to kill *unjuſtly*, or without law; in the concluſion, it is taken *abſolutely* for putting a man to death in general; and therefore the inference is not good.

2. What

2. What I am, you are not;
But I am a man;
Therefore you are not a man.

This is a relative ſyllogiſm; but if it be reduced to a regular form, it will appear there is ambiguity in the terms: thus—

What I am is a man;
You are not what I am;
Therefore you are not a man.

Here, what I am, in the major propoſition, is taken ſpecially for my *nature*; but in the minor propoſition, the ſame words are taken individually for my *perſon*; therefore the inference muſt be falſe; for the ſyllogiſm does not take the term *what I am* both times in the ſame ſenſe.

3. He that ſays you are an animal ſays true;
But he that ſays you are a gooſe, ſays you are an animal;
Therefore, he that ſays you are a gooſe, ſays true.

In

In the major propoſition, the word *animal* ſignifies *human* animal. In the minor, the word animal ſignifies a *gooſe*; whereby it becomes an ambiguous term, and unfit to build the concluſion upon.

It is from this laſt *general teſt* of ſyllogiſms that we derive the cuſtom of the reſpondent in anſwering the arguments of the opponent, which is to diſtinguiſh upon the major or minor propoſition, and declare which term is uſed in two ſenſes, and in what ſenſe the propoſition may be true, and in what ſenſe it is falſe.

General Rules to direct our Reaſoning.

The judgments which we paſs upon things are generally built on ſome ſecret reaſoning or argument, by which the propoſition is ſuppoſed to be proved. But ſome farther aſſiſtances may be given to our reaſoning powers in their ſearch after truth,

truth, from an obſervation of the following rules.

Firſt Rule.

Accuſtom yourſelf to clear and diſtinct ideas, to evident propoſitions, to ſtrong and convincing arguments. Converſe much with thoſe friends, and thoſe books, and thoſe parts of learning, where you meet with the greateſt clearneſs of thought and force of reaſoning. Something of the ſciences ſhould be ſtudied by every one who pretends to learning, and that, as Mr. Locke ſays, not ſo much to make us mathematicians, as to make us reaſonable creatures. The habit of conceiving clearly, of judging juſtly, and of reaſoning well, is not to be attained merely by the brilliance of genius, the beſt natural parts, or the beſt collection of logical precepts. It is cuſtom and practice that muſt form and eſtabliſh this habit. We muſt apply

apply ourſelves to it till we perform all this readily and without reflecting on rules. A coherent thinker, or a ſtrict reaſoner, is not to be made at once by a ſet of rules, any more than a good painter or muſician is to be formed extempore, by an excellent lecture on muſic or painting. It is of infinite importance therefore, in our younger years, to be taught both the value and the practice of conceiving clearly and of reaſoning right; for when we are grown up, it is no wonder we ſhould not learn good reaſoning, any more than that an ignorant clown, after the age of forty, ſhould not be able to learn courtly language or refined behaviour. For want of an early attention, many perſons conceive and judge always in confuſion: they take weak arguments for demonſtration, and are led away by the mere ſemblances of truth. Now if ſuch perſons happen to have a bright imagination, a fluency of ſpeech, and a copiouſneſs of language, they not only impoſe many errors upon their own un-

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underſtandings, but they ſtamp the image of their own miſtakes upon their neighbours, and ſpread their errors abroad. It is a matter of juſt regret to conſider how the multitude of mankind receive any thing into their aſſent upon the moſt trifling grounds. True reaſoning has very little ſhare in forming their opinions. They reſiſt the moſt convincing arguments from an obſtinate adherence to their prejudices, and believe the moſt improbable things with the greateſt aſſurance. A heap of dark and inconſiſtent ideas make up the greater part of their knowledge in philoſophy and religion, having never been taught the uſe and value of clear and juſt reaſoning.

Second Rule.

Enlarge your general acquaintance with things daily, in order to attain a rich fund of topics or middle terms, whereby thoſe propoſitions which occur may either be

proved

proved or diſproved; but eſpecially meditate and inquire with great diligence into the nature, properties, circumſtances, and relations of the particular ſubject about which you judge or argue. You ſhould ſurvey a queſtion on all ſides, and extend your views as far as poſſible to every thing that has a connexion with it.

This practice has many advantages in it. 1. It will be a mean to ſuggeſt to your mind proper topics for argument about any propoſition that relates to the ſame ſubject. 2. It will enable you with greater readineſs to give an anſwer to any ſudden queſtion upon that ſubject, whether it ariſes in your own mind, or is propoſed by others. 3. It will inſtruct you to give a plainer and ſpeedier ſolution of any difficulties that may attend the theme of your diſcourſe, and to refute the objections of thoſe who have eſpouſed a contrary opinion. 4. By ſuch an extenſive ſurvey of the ſubject in all its properties and relations,

tions, you will be better ſecured from inconſiſtencies, that is, from aſſerting or denying any thing in one place, which contradicts what you have aſſerted or denied in another. It is our judging and arguing upon a partial view of things that expoſes us to miſtakes, and leads us into abſurdity, or at leaſt to the very borders of it.

Third Rule.

In exploring the knowledge of things, always keep the preciſe point of the preſent queſtion in your eye. Take heed that you add nothing to it while you are arguing, nor omit any part of it. Watch carefully, leſt any new ideas ſlide in to mingle themſelves either with the ſubject or that which is affirmed of it. See that the queſtion be not altered by the ambiguity of any word taken in different ſenſes; nor let any ſecret prejudices of your own, or the ſophiſtry of others, cheat your underſtanding by

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Fourth Rule.

When you have exactly conſidered the preciſe point of inquiry, or what is unknown in the queſtion, then conſider what and how much you know already of this queſtion, or of the ideas and terms of which it is compoſed. It is by a compariſon of the known and unknown parts of the queſtion together, that you find what reference the part known hath unto, or what connexion it hath with the thing that is ſought. In comparing ideas together, be not too haſty to come to a determination,

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tion, eſpecially in points of importance. Some perſons, when they ſee a little agreement or diſagreement between ideas, preſume a great deal, and ſo jump into the concluſion. This is an expeditious and eaſy road to falſe opinion and conceit, but a moſt unſafe and uncertain way to true knowledge and wiſdom.

Fifth Rule.

In chooſing middle terms or arguments, to prove any queſtion, always take ſuch topics as are ſureſt and leaſt fallible, and which carry the greateſt evidence and ſtrength with them. Be not ſo ſolicitous about the number as the weight of your arguments, eſpecially in proving any propoſition which admits of natural certainty, or complete demonſtration. We ſometimes do injury to a cauſe, by dwelling upon trifling arguments. We amuſe our hearers with uncertainties, by multiplying the

the number of feeble reaſonings, before we mention thoſe which are more ſubſtantial, concluſive, and convincing: and we too often yield up our own aſſent to mere probable arguments, where certain truths may be obtained.

Yet it muſt be confeſſed there are many caſes wherein the growing number of *probable arguments* increaſes the degree of probability, and gives a great and ſufficient confirmation to the truth which is ſought—as, 1. When we are inquiring the true ſenſe of any word or phraſe, we are more confirmed in the ſignification of it, by finding the ſame expreſſion ſo uſed in ſeveral authors, or in ſeveral places of the ſame author. 2. When we are ſearching out the true meaning or opinion of any writer, or inquiring into any doctrine of ſcripture, we come to a ſurer determination of the truth by ſeveral diſtinct places, wherein the ſame thing is expreſſed or plainly implied: becauſe it is not ſo probable that an honeſt, ſkilful reader ſhould miſ-

miſtake the meaning of the writer in many places, as he may in one or two. 3. When we would prove the importance of any ſcriptural doctrine or duty, the multitude of texts, wherein it is repeated and inculcated, ſeems naturally to inſtruct us that it is a matter of greater importance than other things which are but ſlightly or ſingly mentioned in the Bible. 4. From many experiments in natural philoſophy, we may more ſafely infer a general theorem, than we can from one or two. 5. In matters which require preſent practice, we muſt often content ourſelves with a mere preponderation of probable reaſons or arguments. Where there are ſeveral reaſons on each ſide, for and againſt a thing that is to be done or omitted, a ſmall argument added to the heap in either ſcale may juſtly turn the balance, and determine the judgment.

A daily improvement of our underſtandings in affairs human and divine, will beſt teach us to diſtinguiſh in what caſes

the number of arguments adds to their weight and force. It is experience only that can fully inform us when we muſt be determined by *probable* topics, and when we muſt expect *demonſtrations*.

Sixth Rule.

Prove your concluſion, as far as poſſible, by ſome propoſitions that are in themſelves more plain, evident, and certain, than the concluſion; or, at leaſt, ſuch as are more known, and more intelligible to the perſon whom you would convince.

If we neglect this rule, we ſhall endeavour to enlighten that which is obſcure by ſomething equally or more obſcure, and to confirm that which is doubtful by ſomething equally or more uncertain. Common ſenſe dictates to all men that it is impoſſible to eſtabliſh any truth, and to convince others of it, but by ſomething that is better known to them than that truth is.

Seventh Rule.

Labour, in all your arguings, to enlighten the underſtanding, as well as to conquer and captivate the judgment. Argue in ſuch a manner as may give a natural, diſtinct, and ſolid knowledge of things to your hearers, as well as to force their aſſent by a mere proof of the queſtion. Now, to attain this end, the chief topic or medium of your demonſtration ſhould be drawn, as much as poſſible, from the nature of the thing to be proved, or from thoſe things which are moſt naturally connected with it. Indirect and remote arguments may alſo be ſometimes uſed to confirm a propoſition, which has been before proved by arguments more direct and immediate.

Eighth Rule.

You muſt learn to diſtinguiſh well between an explication and an argument, and neither impoſe upon yourſelf, nor ſuffer

fer yourſelf to be impoſed upon by others, from miſtaking a mere illuſtration for a convincing reaſon. Axioms themſelves, or ſelf-evident propoſitions, may want an explication or illuſtration, though they are not to be proved by reaſoning. Similitudes and alluſions have often a very happy influence to explain ſome difficult truth, and to render the idea of it familiar and eaſy. Where the reſemblance is juſt and accurate, the influence of a ſimile may proceed ſo far as to ſhow the poſſibility of the thing in queſtion; but ſimiles muſt not be taken as ſolid proofs of the truth of thoſe things to which they have a reſemblance. Mr. Locke, even in his inquiries after truth, makes great uſe of ſimiles for frequent illuſtration, and is very happy in the invention of them; but he cautions us againſt miſtaking them for concluſive arguments.

And here let it be noted, that a parable or ſimilitude may give a ſufficient proof of the true ſenſe and meaning of an author,

provided we draw not the ſimilitude beyond its real ſcope and deſign; as when our Saviour affirms, "I will come on thee *as a* "*thief*:" it is plainly evident that he deſcribes the *unexpectedneſs* of his appearance, and is by no means to be drawn to ſignify any *injuſtice* in his deſign.

Ninth Rule.

In your whole courſe of reaſoning, keep your mind ſincerely intent on the purſuit of truth; and follow ſolid argument whereſoever it leads you. Let not a party ſpirit, nor any paſſion or prejudice, ſtop or avert the current of your reaſoning in queſt of true knowledge.

When you are inquiring therefore into any ſubject, maintain a due regard to the arguments and objections on both ſides of a queſtion. Conſider, compare, and balance them well, before you determine for one ſide. It is a frequent, but a very faulty practice, to hunt after arguments only

only to make good one ſide of a queſtion, and entirely to neglect and refuſe thoſe which favour the other ſide. If we have not given a due weight to arguments on both ſides, we do but wilfully miſguide our judgment, and abuſe our reaſon, by forbidding its ſearch after truth. When we eſpouſe opinions from a ſecret bias on the mind, through the influences of fear, hope, honour, credit, intereſt, or any other prepoſſeſſion, and then ſeek arguments only to ſupport thoſe opinions, we have neither done our duty to God nor to ourſelves; and it is a matter of mere chance and accident if we ſtumble upon truth in our way. The power of reaſoning was given us by our Maker for this very purpoſe, to purſue truth; and we abuſe one of his richeſt gifts, if we unworthily yield it up, to be led aſtray by any of the meaner powers of nature, or the periſhable intereſts of worldly advantage. Reaſon itſelf, if fairly and honeſtly exerted, will teach us to receive the divine revelation of

the Goſpel, and, like the light of "the day-"ſpring from on high," will ſhow us the path of everlaſting life.

OF METHOD.

THE art of method and diſpoſition is commonly conſidered as the laſt part of logic.

Method, taken in a general ſenſe, implies the placing of ſeveral things, or performing ſeveral operations, in ſuch an order as is moſt convenient to attain ſome end propoſed; and in this ſenſe it is applied to all the works of nature and art, to all the divine affairs of creation and Providence, and to the artifices, ſchemes, contrivances, and practices of mankind, whether in natural, civil, or ſacred affairs.

But in logic, *method* is uſually taken in a more

more limited ſenſe, and the nature of it is thus deſcribed :—" Method is the diſpoſi-
" tion of a variety of thoughts on any
" ſubject, in ſuch order as may beſt ſerve
" to find out unknown truths, to explain
" and confirm truths that are known, or
" to fix them in the memory." It is diſtributed into two kinds, *natural* and *arbitrary.*

1. *Natural method* is that which obſerves the order of nature, and proceeds in ſuch a manner as that the knowledge of the things which follow depends in a great meaſure on the things which go before; and this is twofold, viz. ſynthetic and analytic.

Synthetic method is that which begins with the parts, and leads onward to the knowledge of the whole; it begins with the moſt ſimple principles and general truths, and proceeds, by degrees, to that which is drawn from them, or compounded of them; and therefore it is called the method of compoſition.

Analytic method takes the whole compound as it finds it, and leads us into the knowledge of it, by reſolving it into its firſt principles or parts, and its ſpecial properties; and therefore it is called the method of reſolution.

If we know the parts of any ſubject better than the whole, we conſider the parts diſtinctly, and, by putting them together, we come to the knowledge of the whole. So in grammar, we learn firſt to know letters; we join them, to make ſyllables; out of ſyllables we compoſe words, and out of words we make ſentences and diſcourſes. This is the *ſynthetic* method.

But if we are better acquainted with the whole than we are with particular parts, then we divide or reſolve the whole into its parts, and thereby gain a diſtinct knowledge of them. So we are firſt acquainted with the whole body of an animal, and then, by anatomy and diſſection, we come to learn all the inward and outward parts of it. This is the *analytic* method.

2. *Ar-*

2. *Arbitrary method* leaves the order of nature, and accommodates itſelf to many purpoſes; ſuch as to treaſure up things, and retain them in memory; to harangue and perſuade mankind; or to delight, amuſe, or entertain the mind.

It is chiefly poeſy and oratory that require the practice of an arbitrary or hidden method. They omit things eſſential which are not beautiful; they inſert little needleſs circumſtances and beautiful digreſſions; they invert times and actions, in order to place every thing in the moſt affecting point of view; and, for this end, they neglect all logical forms: yet, an acquaintance with the forms of logic and natural method, is of admirable uſe to thoſe who would attain theſe arts in perfection.

The general requiſites of true method in the purſuit or communication of knowledge are the following: it ſhould be ſecure from error; plain and eaſy; diſtinctly arranged; full, without deficiency; comprehenſive, without ſuperfluity; proper to the ſubject and deſign; and well connected.

Of Diviſion and Subdiviſion.

To obtain a proper *diviſion* of a ſubject, we muſt examine the number of its parts, and diſpoſe them in ſuch order as to preſent them all to the view, without confuſion or repetition; which will be effected by the following rules:

1. In all diviſions of any ſubject phyſical or moral, we muſt follow the natural order, mentioning the cauſe before the effect, the larger or nobler parts before the inferior or leſs minute. Thus nature plainly leads us to divide a tree into the root, trunk, and branches, and a kingdom into provinces, cities, towns, and villages. It would be improper to divide the one into bark and leaves, or the other into ſtreets and fields.

2. The parts of a diviſion ſhould not contain one another; and hence it would be improper to divide an animal into body, head, limbs, and bones; becauſe bones are included in all the other parts.

3. Each part taken ſeparately muſt be leſs

leſs than the whole; but all the parts taken together ſhould be nearly equal to it: thus, to divide a tree into trunk and leaves, would be an imperfect diviſion, ſince the whole is not complete without root and branches.

4. More ſubdiviſions than are neceſſary to explain any ſubject ſhould be avoided—as for example: in a general deſcription of an eſtate, it would be ſufficient to ſay, it conſiſts of arable or paſture lands, of woods or coppices; though a minuter ſurvey might require that the dimenſions of the fields ſhould be given, the nature of the ſoil, whether dry or damp, and ſown with oats, barley, or wheat, &c.

Before any attempt is made at compoſition, we ſhould acquire a clear, general idea of the ſubject propoſed; the ſecondary parts which branch out from the main ſubject, form *diviſions*, or ſections; and when theſe parts are ſtill farther divided, they are called *ſubdiviſions*.

Let the following concluding example ſerve as an illuſtration.

The

The ſubject propoſed is the

Duty *of* Man.

The duty of man divides itſelf into three kinds, *human*, *ſocial*, and *divine*.—The firſt comprehends all the duties we owe to *ourſelves*—the ſecond, thoſe we owe to *ſociety*—and the third, our behaviour and duty to *God*. *Human virtue* conſiſts in the right uſe of our reaſon, and the regular ordering of our paſſions and appetites, and may be ſubdivided into the particular duties of *conſideration*, *humility*, *meekneſs*, *contentment*, *prudence*, *fortitude*, and *temperance*.

Conſideration is the habit of thinking, and attending to whatever concerns us; it keeps the rational faculties always in exerciſe, and leads us to find the pleaſure and advantage of furniſhing the mind with any uſeful knowledge and experience.

Humility teaches us to keep in ourſelves a ſubmiſſive and condeſcending temper; to watch againſt the firſt emotions of pride, vain-glory, and ſelf-conceit.

Meekneſs is the keeping our reſentment

and

and angry paſſions under command; by which we are delivered from fierceneſs or raſh anger; from fury or violent anger; and from malice or continued anger.

Contentment is the moderating of our covetous, fretful, and envious paſſions. By this virtue we are freed from uneaſy thoughts about our own lot and ſtation in the world, from irregular deſires after things which it is improbable we ſhould ever obtain, and from envying the eaſe, enjoyments, or poſſeſſions of others.

Prudence is the wiſe and orderly diſpoſal of our thoughts, words, actions, and affairs. This leads us to ſtudy well the reaſon and fitneſs of things, with regard to ourſelves and others; by which means raſhneſs of expreſſion and indecency of action are prevented; an eager talkative diſpoſition is cured; affectation is ſhamed; mean and vain amuſements are dropped; and a diſorderly unforecaſting temper is brought to method and contrivance.

Fortitude is that ſtrength and conſtancy of mind

mind which teaches us to bear the diſpenſations of Providence, the afflictions of the body, the frowns of fortune, the villainy of wicked, and the impertinence of fooliſh men, with patience and reſignation.

Temperance is the regular and moderate uſe of thoſe things that are allowed for the health, pleaſure, and ſuſtenance of the body; and by which we are taught to abſtain from all exceſs in eating and drinking, to be modeſt in our clothing and ornaments, to be moderate in our diverſions, to ſubdue all irregular and violent paſſions, and ſo to preſerve the body from ſloth and idleneſs, as to render it a fit inſtrument both of action and pleaſure to the mind.

The *ſecond* diviſion of moral virtue comprehends the duties we owe to *Society*. Social virtue conſiſts in behaving rightly, and in doing what is juſt and fit to all with whom we have to do; and may be comprehended under the ſix following heads—*juſtice*, *charity*, *courteſy*, *modeſty*, *gratitude*, and *peaceableneſs*.

Juſ-

Juſtice forbids every thing that would injure another, either in his eſtate and poſſeſſion, or in his reputation and good name. It forbids all theft of money or goods, all malicious wrongs, or injuring a perſon out of ſpite; all oppreſſion, where a man has power over the goods or trade and buſineſs of another; and all frauds, where a man has more knowledge and wit than another, or is let into ſome ſecret by which he takes advantage to deceive and injure him. Juſtice alſo forbids us to hurt the credit and reputation of another, by witneſſing openly things that are falſe, or by whiſpering ſecretly evil ſurmiſes and reproachful ſtories; or by aggravating ſmall faults with wrong and malicious circumſtances; or by deriding and ſcoffing at a perſon, to make him appear contemptible.

Charity has reſpect to the *faults*, the *wants*, and the *opinions* of men. As it reſpects the faults and failings of men, it conſiſts in preventing others, as much as we can, from committing them; in putting

ting the beſt conſtruction upon the faults of others; in counſelling and endeavouring to amend thoſe who do amiſs; in forgiving many offences; and in avoiding all needleſs talk of a perſon's frailties, and diſliking to hear reports ſpread of them. As it hath reſpect to the *wants* and *neceſſities* of others, it ſhows itſelf in inquiring after diſtreſſed perſons, in pitying thoſe who are in want and affliction, and in being tenderly affected towards them; in managing our own expenſes, ſo as to have ſomething ready for charitable occaſions; and in being well pleaſed when opportunities of doing good offer themſelves. Laſtly, in matters of *opinion*, charity will conſider and allow for different education and impreſſion of things upon the minds of men, and for different capacities and judgment.

Courteſy is that virtue by which we are taught to conduct ourſelves towards all in a humane, civil, affable, and condeſcending manner. This is peculiarly graceful in princes and civil magiſtrates, in great men

to

to their inferiors, and in all maſters of families to their wives, children, and ſervants.

Modeſty teaches us the due deference and reſpect which we owe to all who are ſuperior to us either by birth or fortune, or by any uſeful knowledge, learning, and wiſdom.

Gratitude is the being ſo ſenſible of a benefit or obligation as to exert ourſelves in proper returns of kindneſs or thankfulneſs. It conſiſts in a careful obſervation of benefits conferred, that they do not paſs neglected, nor be taken for things of courſe; in a true value and eſteem for the ſpirit and principles from whence ſuch favours flow, interpreting them in the beſt manner; and in a diſpoſition to make ſuitable returns, and rejoicing in the opportunities of doing ſo.

Peaceableneſs is that virtue which teaches us to be quiet and eaſy in ourſelves, and inoffenſive to others. In order to this, we muſt bring our own minds into a ſettled tran-

tranquillity, and an habitual diſpoſition to be quiet. We muſt have in our hearts an unconquerable benevolence and good-will. We muſt watch againſt every reproachful word, and defaming or provoking expreſſion.

Our duty to GOD conſtitutes the *third* branch of moral virtue.—The chief part of our duty to God conſiſts in the conſtant practice of all the foregoing virtues, as occaſions offer, through the whole courſe of our lives; and in looking upon them as the eternal and unalterable laws which he has given us to act by. To which we muſt add, a profound veneration of his almighty power and wiſdom, a fear of offending his juſtice, an entire reliance on his goodneſs and providence, a pious reſignation to his will, with prayer and thankſgiving for his continual mercies; always regarding this life as a ſtate of probation and trial only, in which, according as we behave ourſelves well or ill, we ſhall reap our reward or ſuffer in another.

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